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For almost fifty years, until the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
arrived in 1996 (FTDA), state dilution laws existed in relative
obscurity, below the radar screens of many trademark lawyers. After
the passage of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA),
there is little reason for the existence of a parallel, and non-uniform,
set of state laws. However, neither express preemption nor repeal
appears to be a realistic option in the foreseeable future. As long as
they do not interfere with the operation of federal law, and do not
upset the balances built into federal law, their continued existence
will not significantly affect the path of trademark law. And, while
state trademark law might have a limited role as a "gap filler, " that
role must be circumscribed to prevent interference with the goals of
federal law.
t Visiting Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Professor of Law,
Whittier Law School. J.D. New York University School of Law, 1978; A.B. Princeton
University, 1975.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With all of the attention in trademark dilution being paid to the
newly amended federal statute, state dilution laws have been ignored.
But state laws are where dilution protection began, almost fifty years
before the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) was enacted.1
Thirty-eight states now have dilution laws.2 After sixty years of
experience with state laws, the last eleven coexisting with federal law,
it is appropriate to take stock of the future of state dilution law. My
conclusion, for the reasons set forth below, is that state law has
outlived its usefulness in this area, though there may be a place for
state law in a related area of trademark law-protection of "well
known" marks.3 Explaining just why this is so requires that we begin
with some background.
II. STATE DILUTION LAWS: IN THE BEGINNING ....
It is commonly accepted among trademark scholars and
practitioners that the instigation for dilution laws was Frank
Schechter's 1927 Harvard Law Review article. 4 It is less known that
Schechter tried, but failed, to have dilution protection included in an
early iteration of what became the Lanham Act.5 Thus, it was left to
1. Massachusetts enacted the first dilution statute, in 1947. Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307,
§ 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIOH § 13
(West Supp. 2007)). See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3(a),
109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000)) (amended by the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act in 2006).
2. DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-7 (Supp. 2007) (2002). Some cases have found that a common law
claim exists under Ohio law. See, e.g., Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 424 (6th
Cir. 1999); Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987). See
also United States Playing Card Co. v. The Bicycle Club, 695 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997) (discussing a laches defense to a common law dilution claim). This contravenes the
Restatement, which only recognizes a dilution claim where there is a statute creating such a
cause of action. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1) (1995).
3. See infra Part X.
4. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927).
5. See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-54 (2002) (discussing Schechter's 1932 testimony before a House
Committee). In addition, in 1932, Rep. Perkins introduced a bill that would have included
dilution in the protections to be offered by the pending new trademark legislation. Id. at 154-55,
app. at 173.
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states, the supposed laboratories of experimentation, 6 to implement
Schechter's ideas.
It was twenty years after Schechter's article appeared before the
first state dilution statute was enacted.7 This was also just after
passage of the Lanham Act, which, as noted above, contained no
dilution provision. The states, however, did not show much
inclination for experimenting in this area. Seventeen years after
passage of the Massachusetts law, when the United States Trademark
Association 8 added a dilution provision to the Model State Trademark
Bill,9 only five states had enacted dilution laws, and all were
essentially the same.' 0
It is also perhaps disingenuous to say that the states truly
implemented Schechter's ideas. The first statutes gave a cause of
action for "[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark."'" They were not limited to coined
marks, which was a limitation contained in Schechter's article, and
Schechter did not posit a claim akin to "injury to business reputation"
(although he did posit a claim for injury to business magnetism via its
trademark). On the other hand, the Model Bill did encourage
additional states to adopt dilution laws. By the mid-1980s, almost half
the states had such a statute.' 2 The statues were virtually the same, but
they were seldom used and often misconstrued. Courts, especially
federal courts hearing state claims as supplemental claims, often
inserted a requirement of confusion into statutes that expressly
disclaimed the need for it.' 3 It was not until 1977 that a state court
6. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
7. This was in Massachusetts. See supra note 1.
8. Now the International Trademark Association, or INTA.
9. WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 14-15. The Model Bill provision was virtually the same
as the Massachusetts law. The text of the Model Bill provision is reproduced in 3 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:8 (4th ed. 2007).
10. In addition to Massachusetts, they were Illinois (1953), New York (1955), Georgia
(1955), and Connecticut (1963). WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 12, 17.
1I. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (1961 N.Y. Laws 1806, 1813) (recodified at N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2008)); 140 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22
(West 1986) (superseded by 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 1036/5, 1036/65 (West 2001)); GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (2000).
12. See David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531,
536 n.35 (1991).
13. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 64 n.28 (citing cases).
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forcefully put its foot down and insisted that the local statute be read
as written, that is, without any requirement of confusion.
14
However, these state laws did not define what dilution was, and
the courts were wary of giving the statutes an overly expansive
reading, lest they swallow up traditional trademark infringement
law. 5 Cases almost never turned on state dilution law alone; success
on a dilution claim almost always followed success on an
infringement claim. 16 So the value of state laws, except in theory and,
perhaps, cease and desist letters, was limited.
III. STATE LAWS: THE SECOND WAVE
In 1988, Congress gave dilution a further nudge by nearly
enacting a federal dilution law as part of a comprehensive revision of
the Lanham Act. Though the dilution provision failed,' 7 the effort led
to a new Model Bill dilution provision in 1992, similar to the failed
federal bill.18 This new provision was enacted by several states. 19
Because the new Model Bill provision (like the proposed federal law)
differed significantly from the 1964 version, there was now some
differentiation among the state laws. Where once there were only
laws giving injunctive relief for "likelihood of dilution," of
(apparently) any distinctive mark, now there were a group of dilution
laws protecting only "famous" marks, with a definition, of sorts, of
14. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165-66 (N.Y.
1977). However, the court ultimately rejected the dilution claim because it found the mark
insufficiently distinctive. Id. at 1166.
15. E.g., Coffee Dan's, Inc. v. Coffee Don's Charcoal Broiler, 305 F. Supp. 1210, 1217
n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir.
1981).
16. There were some exceptions, of course, and they stand out because of their rarity.
E.g., Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 694
F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1982); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S., Inc., 702 F. Supp.
1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989); Cushman v. Mutton Hollow Land
Dev., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 150, 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (although the parties were in related
businesses, relief only granted on state dilution grounds). In the 1990s, the Second Circuit
upheld a claim solely based on New York's dilution statute in Deere & Co. v. MTD Products,
Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d
540, 542 (1st Cir. 1957) (seemingly deciding on both unfair competition and dilution grounds,
but stating, in connection with the unfair competition claim, "[t]his is obviously a dilution
case").
17. The dilution provision passed the Senate, but failed in the House, where opponents
cited its failure to protect free expression. WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 156-57. The provision
was part of a larger bill that did pass: the Trademark Law Revision Act.
18. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13 (INTA 1992), reprinted in 4 MCCARTHY,
supra note 9, § 24:79.
19. WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 18-19.
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dilution, and allowing damages in certain cases. 20 However, one
would be hard pressed to find a case interpreting these new statutes
over the succeeding eight years. The large states, where most of the
cases were brought (albeit in federal court), generally kept their
original statutes, which were based on the 1964 Model Bill.
2
'
Although the number of state dilution cases prior to 1996 was
fairly small, it would be a mistake to assume that state laws
contributed nothing of analytical consequence prior, or subsequent to,
the passage of a federal dilution statute. In particular, claims decided
under New York's dilution law prior to the FTDA's passage made a
lasting impact on dilution. In the area of eligibility for protection,
several Second Circuit decisions stated that an "extremely strong
mark" was required. This requirement alone has eliminated a large
number of marks from dilution protection. The narrowing of
eligibility to the strongest marks is reflected in the federal statute's
restriction of eligibility to "famous" marks-an even smaller category
of marks.2 3
Even more significant analytically was a 1989 case involving
Mead Data Central's LEXIS mark and the then-new LEXUS division
of Toyota.24 The district court entered a nationwide injunction against
Lexus, based solely on New York's dilution law. 5 The Second
Circuit soon reversed, and in a concurring opinion, Judge Robert
Sweet decided to try and create a multifactor test for dilution similar
to the multifactor test for likelihood of confusion.26 Not only did this
20. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13 (INTA 1992), reprinted in 4 MCCARTHY,
supra note 9, § 24:79.
21. Those states included California (which changed its statute in 2007), New York,
Texas, Massachusetts, Florida (which changed its statute in 2006), Illinois (which changed its
statute in 1998), Georgia, Missouri, and Pennsylvania (which changed its statute in 1998). See
WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 20-21 (chart); WELKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 6.
22. Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983). See also
WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 37 n.72; WELKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 5-7. (citing cases).
23. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007).
24. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, (2d Cir.
1989).
25. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031, 1045
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 875 F.2d 1026, (2d Cir. 1989).
26. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1035 (Sweet, J., concurring). The panel majority
focused primarily on a lack of similarity between the LEXIS and LEXUS marks, and
secondarily on a lack of distinctiveness of the LEXIS mark. Id. at 1029-31. Judge Sweet
believed that the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of dilution. Id. at 1035-37. Judge Sweet
used the following factors: " 1) similarity of the marks; 2) similarity of the products covered by
the marks; 3) sophistication of consumers; 4) predatory intent; 5) renown of the senior mark; 6)
renown of the junior mark." Id. at 1035. The TDRA uses the following factors to determine
dilution by blurring:
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become the standard test for claims under New York law, it also
became a popular test under the FTDA.27 However, the court that
promulgated that test eventually tired of it, at least for FTDA
28purposes.
Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,29 a Second Circuit case
decided shortly before the FTDA was enacted, demonstrated the
elastic potential of dilution claims. A competitor of Deere &
Company used an animated version of Deere's "deer" logo running
away from the competitor's product in a commercial. 30 Remarkably,
the court found this to constitute actionable dilution under New York
law.31 In another case, decided just after the FTDA was enacted, the
same court did indicate that dilution claims cannot be used
indiscriminately to enjoin parodies.32 The court refused plaintiff
Hormel's request to enjoin the use of a Muppet character called
Spa'am in a movie.3 3 Hormel claimed that this use tarnished its
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association
with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) (West Supp. 2007). Notably, the TDRA does not include
similarity of the products as a factor, which goes more to confusion than dilution. Moreover, the
TDRA's use of exclusivity is important, in that it gives added protection to a smaller subset of
famous marks.
27. WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 247 n. 131 (citing cases).
28. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-21 (2d Cir. 1999) (setting out
a separate test). Whether the Mead Data test was fundamentally different from the Nabisco test
is hard to say. Both had unfortunate overtones of confusion.
29. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
30. Id. at41.
31. Id. at 44. Almost equally remarkably, the court expressly disclaimed tamishment as
the basis for the decision; id. ("nor is there tarnishment"), but subsequently backtracked and
called Deere a tarnishment case. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497,
507 (2d Cir. 1996). It is unclear how Deere would be decided under the TDRA. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007) (excluding from liability nominative "fair uses" of a famous
mark that are not uses as the defendant's trademark).
32. Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 508.
33. Id. at 500.
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SPAM mark.34 Both of these cases were later cited by courts
interpreting the provisions of the FTDA.35
IV. THE RESTATEMENT GETS No RESPECT
Though not strictly speaking a state law issue, one other non-
federal dilution development deserves mention. Less than a year
before the FTDA was passed, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition was promulgated. This new Restatement included a
provision relating to trademark dilution.36 The Restatement took a
relatively conservative position on dilution. For a blurring claim it
required that plaintiff have a "highly distinctive" mark, and required
that the offending use be a use as defendant's trademark.37 In the area
of tarnishment, the Restatement appeared to reject the Deere case in
two respects: it required that the offending use be a trademark use or,
if the tarnishing use was not a trademark use, it required that the use
be independently tortious.38 But neither the proposed federal statute
nor the one enacted in 1995 reflected the Restatement's views and,
except for a Florida decision adopting the Restatement's "highly
distinctive" requirement, 39 the Restatement has had relatively little
influence in the development of state or federal dilution law since its
promulgation.4 °
34. Id. at 500-02. To be sure, Hormel was far from unique in its result. Earlier state law
cases, perhaps most notably L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir.
1987), also held that parodies were protected from dilution claims by the First Amendment.
35. E.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 422
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (C.D. I11. 2003).
The FTDA's specific exclusions from liability (which are not part of New York's law) may also
cover these situations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C) (2000).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995).
37. Id.
38. Section 25(1) requires a trademark use; § 25(2) requires a tarnishing, non-trademark
use to be independently tortious. Id.
39. Great S. Bank v. First S. Bank, 625 So. 2d 463, 470 & n.20 (Fla. 1993) (citing a draft
of the Restatement).
40. The list of citations to this section published by the American Law Institute shows
only 34 citations through November, 2006, only two of which were in state courts.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, CASE CITATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW (Supp. 2007). That amounts to about three citations a year at a time when dilution
opinions abounded. In one respect, current federal law may reflect the Restatement approach.
The TDRA does appear to require a trademark use by the offending party. See WELKOWITZ,
supra note 2, at 66. There is a very limited exception-where a state law dilution claim is
asserted against a federal registered mark, the state law claim is preempted. 15 U.S.C.A. §
I 125(c)(6)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007).
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V. ENTER THE FEDERAL LAW, AND MORE STATE LAWS
A. Post-FTDA, Pre-Moseley developments
The newly enacted FTDA became effective in January of 1996,
as Dilution was now a "hot" claim and court opinions abounded.
Somewhat curiously, the FTDA did not preempt state law; the stated
reason was to preserve states' ability to protect locally well known
marks from dilution.41 The tradition of allowing state trademark law
to coexist with federal law also played a role in this decision.42 At the
same time, INTA made some adjustments to the dilution section of
the1992 Model State Trademark Bill, 43 and more states enacted
statutes based on the FTDA. A number of states even replaced their
older statutes with new ones based on the new Model Bill
provisions.4 By 2003, almost three quarters of the states had dilution
laws, and a majority of those had laws patterned after the 1992 or
1996 Model Bill provision.
The FTDA certainly spawned a large number of dilution claims,
but it shifted the focus from state to federal law. Naturally, litigators
appended to their FTDA claims supplemental claims under state
dilution laws, but these were largely superfluous. In many states the
laws were virtually identical to the federal laws, so that a decision on
liability on the federal claim virtually guaranteed the same result
under state law. The courts, however, did not ponder the possible
differences in remedies available, since non-injunctive relief was
rarely appropriate.4 5 Even in those states whose laws were still based
on the 1964 Model Bill, federal courts generally assumed that the
41. H.R. REP No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
The FTDA did preempt state dilution laws in one limited context: where the state law claim was
being asserted against a federal registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000) (amended and
renumbered in 2006 by the TDRA). The TDRA retained this provision, but in a slightly
reworded form, and renumbered it as Section (c)(6). 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(6).
42. H.R. REP No. 104-374, at 4, (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031;
see The United States Trademark Association Review Commission Report and
Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 457-
58 (1987) (noting that federal courts can preempt if there is a conflict).
43. INTA tweaked its 1992 Model Bill provision in 1996 to conform to the FTDA, by
adding three exclusions from liability. It also altered the category of protected marks from
"famous" to "famous in [the] state." WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 17.
44. States changing their existing laws included Arkansas, Illinois, Minnesota, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. A few states changed their statutes shortly before the
FTDA; Iowa and Connecticut are two examples. See id. at 20-21.
45. Damages under the FTDA were only permitted in cases of "willful intent" to dilute
another's mark. States with newer statutes generally have similar limitations. Older laws only
allowed injunctive relief.
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operative standard under the FTDA was the same as that of the older
laws-likelihood of dilution-and thus made even those laws almost
superfluous. 46 For example, the Ninth Circuit assumed, and continues
to assume, that California's statute requires a "famous" mark, even
though no such requirement appears in the statute.47
The state where state dilution laws retained the greatest
theoretical relevance seemed to be New York. This occurred for two
reasons. First, the Second Circuit recognized that New York's statute
did not require a "famous" mark, though the courts usually (and I
stress "usually") required a very strong mark.48 This left some area for
state law to fill in a gap-where a mark was strong, but not famous.
Second, in 2001 the Second Circuit held that the FTDA only
protected inherently distinctive marks,49 thus leaving out descriptive
marks, even those with tremendous secondary meaning, and other
non-inherently distinctive marks, such as color and product design.
50
This too created a gap that could be filled by state law,5 but the
number of such interstitial cases was small, and plaintiffs still had to
show a likelihood of dilution.
Other aspects of the FTDA made the irrelevance of state laws
even more pronounced. In 1999, Congress amended sections 2(f) and
13 of the Lanham Act to permit the Patent and Trademark Office to
consider dilution as a basis for refusing registration, provided it is
raised in an opposition proceeding-the PTO does not raise the issue
of dilution of an existing mark on its own, even federal dilution.5 2
46. E.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1999)
(California law uses same standard as FTDA); Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d
242, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying same test to claims under federal and New York dilution
laws).
47. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007).
48. WELKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 35-38 (citing and discussing cases).
49. TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 96-98 (2d Cir. 2001).
50. See, e.g., Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion In Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 355, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 00 CIV. 5936(LMM), 2002 WL
1837402 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2002).
51. N. Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N. Y., N. Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 557 (2d Cir. 2002)
(marks not inherently distinctive not eligible for federal protection, but are eligible for
protection under New York law).
52. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1052(f), 1063 (West Supp. 2007). Section 1052(f) currently provides,
in relevant part:
A mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title, may be refused registration only
pursuant to a proceeding brought under section 1063 of this title. A registration
for a mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title, may be canceled pursuant to a
2008]
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However, the statute carefully limits the PTO to considering dilution
"under section 1125(c)," i.e., Section 43(c). 53 Any possible dilution
under state law is not considered.54 Thus, one can obtain a federal
registration of a mark that is likely to cause dilution under state law,
as long as it is not likely to cause dilution under federal law. This
would most likely occur if a mark is not sufficiently famous to qualify
for federal dilution protection.55 It might also occur if the state
standard for dilution was less stringent than the federal. At this point,
the very limited preemption provision of the FTDA comes into play.
Section 43(c)(6) 56 preempts any use of state dilution law against a
federally registered mark. Thus, once the mark is registered, it is
immune from attack under state dilution laws by virtue of Section
43(c)(6). This means that any state dilution protection for locally well
known marks can be circumvented by obtaining a federal
registration.57
From the time the federal law became effective in 1996, to the
next major dilution event in 2003, state laws were made almost
invisible by the FTDA. Even in the Second Circuit, where New York
law theoretically had a role to play, there is little evidence of a rush to
assert state law claims in lieu of federal ones.
B. Moseley Changes the Landscape
Everything changed on March 4, 2003, when the Supreme Court
decided its only FTDA case, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
58
The case attracted a great deal of attention, due in part to the racy
facts and entities involved. Doctrinally, Moseley was a major blow to
proponents of dilution protection. The narrow issue it decided was the
meaning of the phrase "causes dilution" in the FTDA, an issue on
proceeding brought under either section 1064 of this title or section 1092 of this
title.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (West Supp. 2007). (The original language referred to a "mark which when
used would cause dilution.")
53. Id. at §§ 1052(f), 1063.
54. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1343-44 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
55. If the mark is nationally well known, opposition might be based on federal dilution
grounds.
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(6) (West Supp. 2007). The provision originally was §
43(c)(3). It was renumbered and reworded by the TDRA, but the current version is not
materially different from the original.
57. As indicated supra note 5 1, the owner of a locally well-known mark could oppose
registration on the grounds of likelihood of confusion.
58. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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which the circuits had split.59 The Court unanimously 6° held that the
phrase meant that actual dilution needed to be shown to prevail under
the FTDA, not just likelihood of dilution.6' As the many futile dilution
claims over the next three years demonstrated, proof of actual dilution
was a nearly insurmountable obstacle, and federal dilution claims
dwindled.62
The inability to win cases under federal law might have led to a
greater focus on state law, but that did not occur. Ironically, INTA's
success in the preceding decade, when it convinced states to amend
their trademark laws to include dilution provisions like those in the
FTDA, now proved disastrous. 63 All of those newer state laws
contained the same "causes dilution" language as the FTDA.
Naturally, courts64 interpreted these laws to require actual dilution as
well. 65 Adding to the irony, states that kept their older laws, like New
59. Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1999) (actual dilution required) with Nabisco, Inc.
v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999) (likelihood of dilution sufficient) and V
Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 475 (6th Cir. 2001) (same), rev'd, 537 U.S.
418 (2003).
60. Well, sort of unanimously. Although he joined the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy
also wrote a concurring opinion that sounded more like a dissent. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 433.
62. The Court did state that "circumstantial evidence" could be used to show actual
dilution, but gave only one example-where the marks used by both parties were identical. Id. at
434. Some claims, particularly for counterfeit marks, uses by franchisees beyond the license
term, or some domain names, succeeded on this basis. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Yazan's
Service Plaza, Inc., No. 05-70804, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75941 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2006)
(counterfeit cigarettes); Bliss Clearing Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest Brake Bond Co., 339 F. Supp.
2d 944, 968-69 (W.D. Mich. 2004); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. McEvoy, 300 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356-57 (D.
Md. 2004) (terminated franchisee); Nike Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d
1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (counterfeit goods); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d
696, 701-02 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (sale of genuine goods in an unauthorized manner). See also Qwest
Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. v. Amette, No. 3:05-CV-1614-G, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17, at *14 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 3, 2006) (HOMEQWEST and SIGNQWEST found identical to QWEST). But in non-
identical marks cases, which is a much larger number, the Seventh Circuit's observation was
apt: "The Court did not explain and no one seems to know what that 'circumstantial evidence'
might be." Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003).
63. From 1989-2003, 13 states added dilution provisions, and another 10 changed their
existing dilution laws from ones based on earlier Model Bills to ones based on the FTDA. By
the end of 2003, 37 states had dilution laws, a majority of which contained the same "causes
dilution" language that was at issue in Moseley. WELKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 4-9.
64. In reality, this refers to federal courts. I can find no published opinion from a state
court interpreting any of the newer state laws. The implications of this are discussed infra Part
VII.
65. See DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 935 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003). Most
states have statutes directing their courts to consider federal interpretations of the Lanham Act
as persuasive authority when interpreting similarly worded state laws. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §
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York, Texas, California, Florida, and Massachusetts, seemed poised
to fill the "gap" in the FTDA, because their laws expressly required
only a likelihood of dilution. 66 A few cases recognized this difference,
though it is unclear that it changed the outcome of many cases. 67 After
Moseley, those states that had retained their older laws were the most
relevant fora for dilution claims. Even so, the number of successful
state law claims was very small. That state law was not immediately
touted as the answer to Moseley indicates how focused the dilution
world was on federal claims and that the desire to make federal claims
easier to win was of great importance to the trademark community.6 8
VI. THE TDRA AND ITS EFFECT ON STATE LAWS
The most recent development in dilution was the passage of the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA). 69 The most
critical aspect of the TDRA from the standpoint of state laws is its
express inclusion of likelihood of dilution as the operative standard.7°
Other provisions of the TDRA, however, are relevant to this
discussion. First, the TDRA creates and defines two categories of
dilution: dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment. 71 No state
4-71-218 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.181 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-518 (2003); 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 1036/90 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-1-0.5 (West Supp. 2007);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-220 (Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-127 (Supp. 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:3-13a (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-2 (LexisNexis 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
25-518 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-102 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.930 (West
1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-2-19 (LexisNexis 2006). Accord MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL
§ 19(b) (2007), available at
http://www.inta.org/index/php?option=comcontent&task=view&id= 1393 &ltemid= l 54&getco
ntent-3.
66. Strangely, the Ninth Circuit has been slow to realize the difference. See Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1031 n.48 (9th Cir. 2004) (California
dilution statute, modeled after the 1964 Model Bill, interpreted to be same as FTDA). However,
some recent district courts did so. See Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Natural Health
Trends Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1475, 1479 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that the California dilution
statute only requires likelihood of dilution).
67. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1138, 1146
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding no dilution under New York law or the FTDA), vacated and
remanded, 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d Cir. 2007) (vacating for reconsideration of the TDRA, which
was enacted while the case was on appeal). Cf Starbucks Corp. v. Lundberg, No. Civ. 02-948-
HA, 2005 WL 3183858, *7, *10-12 (D. Or. 2005) (finding dilution under Oregon law without
any discussion of the FTDA, but also finding infringement by confusion under federal law).
68. Within a month of the Moseley decision the International Trademark Association had
appointed a committee to propose a redraft of the FTDA.
69. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)).
70. Id. § 1125(c)(1).
71. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B), (C).
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law contains or defines those categories. Second, the TDRA includes
a list of six factors to guide courts in the analysis of likelihood of
dilution by blurring;72 no state laws contain any factors. Third, the
TDRA creates a new standard for demonstrating that a mark is
famous-it must be "widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States as a designation of source" 73-and reduces
the number of guiding factors in the analysis of the fame of the mark
to four.74 Again, none of the existing state statutes contains such a
definition, and those that contain guiding factors use ones similar or
identical to those contained in the original FTDA. The result of the
TDRA is not simply that state laws are nearly superfluous. Worse, the
TDRA makes the proper interpretation of state laws hopelessly
difficult to predict.
Of the TDRA amendments, the change in the operative standard
is the most far-reaching. The federal standard is now significantly
different from, and much easier to satisfy than, most state law
standards. Because a majority of the states now have statutes that
impose liability of a second use "causes dilution" of a famous mark,
those statutes will continue to require actual dilution.75 However, the
relationship between the TDRA standard and the older state laws is
more difficult to determine. The TDRA sets out a six factor test for
dilution by blurring.7 6 To the extent that any test for blurring exists
72. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi).
73. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
74. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
75. See, e.g., AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1045 n.5 (N.D. I11. 2006)
(Illinois law requires actual dilution). Florida's new statute escapes this problem. Apparently
learning from the FTDA experience, Florida's statute imposes liability on the basis of
"likelihood of dilution." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West Supp. 2008). However, it is
otherwise the same as the 1996 Model Bill, and the original FTDA; it contains eight fame
factors, no likelihood of dilution factors, and has the old definition of dilution, which may
exclude tarnishment. California's new statute follows the 2007 Model Bill (and the TDRA).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 14202(k)-(m), 14247 (West Supp. 2008).
76. The factors are:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended tp create am association
with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi).
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under the older state laws, it would be the six factor test set forth by
Judge Sweet in Mead Data.77 Some of the factors overlap: both
incorporate predatory intent and the fame (or "renown") of the
plaintiff s mark. Other factors are quite dissimilar: the Mead Data test
includes product similarity, which is more akin to confusion, and the
renown of the junior mark, which is not found in the TDRA. The
TDRA factors include evidence of mental association; although Mead
Data does not mention this factor, one assumes it would have been
deemed relevant. The TDRA also includes a "uniqueness" factor-the
exclusivity of use factor. This factor potentially narrows the range of
protected marks, by giving an advantage to unique marks. Given the
apparent irrelevance of confusion under the TDRA (or at least its
lessened relevance) and the emphasis on uniqueness, it may be
slightly easier to win a dilution case under the Mead Data test than
under the TDRA.
However, Mead Data may not be representative of state law. In
the first place, Mead Data was an opinion of a concurring judge in a
federal court lawsuit, where the court issued its own interpretation of
New York law. Its test has not been adopted by the New York state
courts (there has not been a definitive analysis of blurring by the New
York state courts), nor has it been adopted by state courts in other
states. Second, the Mead Data test has been criticized by courts and
commentators.78 In light of later experience, the Second Circuit could
decide that the TDRA's test is a better approximation of what the
New York legislature had in mind for the state statute. Other courts
may make the assumption that, as a distillation of experience with
blurring, the TDRA factors are superior to other tests. This may make
the older state laws roughly congruent to the TDRA.
The alternative would be a fair amount of uncertainty and
confusion. Courts would have to separately analyze state and federal
77. These were the factors used by Judge Sweet:
1) similarity of the marks
2) similarity of the products covered by the marks
3) sophistication of consumers
4) predatory intent
5) renown of the senior mark
6) renown of the junior mark
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (Sweet, J.,
concurring).
78. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 473 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001),
rev'don other grounds, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d
27, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 826-27 (1997).
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law claims, without any real guidance as to the proper analysis of the
former.79 In the absence of any indication of legislative intent to the
contrary, the TDRA's factors provide a reasonable basis for analyzing
state claims based on likelihood of dilution. If the TDRA factors are
adopted as state law, then the main operative difference between the
older state laws and federal law will be the need for a famous mark
under federal law. We would have returned to the situation that
existed prior to the Moseley opinion, at least for those states with
older laws.
80
In addition to the requirement of actual dilution, the newer state
laws-those patterned after the 1992 and 1996 Model Bills-also will
suffer from the argument that their definition of dilution does not
include tarnishment, a result strongly hinted at in the Moseley
opinion.8 ' The TDRA eliminated this argument under federal law by
creating and defining a category of dilution called "dilution by
tarnishment." Combined with the actual dilution requirement, this
means that the newer state laws will be significantly less protective of
famous marks than the TDRA. Moreover, their use of different
"fame" factors further complicates the use of those statutes, especially
where a federal remedy is available.82 Finally, there is the question of
defenses and exclusions from liability. The TDRA altered the first of
the three exclusions from liability contained in the FTDA. Originally,
the FTDA excluded any "fair use ... in comparative commercial
advertising" of a famous mark, as long as it was used to refer to the
famous mark owner's goods, not those of the unauthorized user.83 The
TDRA replaced this exclusion with a more general fair use provision
that excludes nominative and descriptive uses as long as they are not
used as the trademark of the unauthorized user. 84 This exclusion
probably was intended to be broader than the original exclusion. State
79. Recall that the older statutes made no attempt to define "dilution."
80. Florida also has a likelihood of dilution standard, but its statute requires a mark that is
"famous" in Florida and its definition of dilution may not support a tamishment claim. One
other possible difference between older state laws and the TDRA is the type of unauthorized use
that could trigger a violation. The TDRA appears to require that the offending use be a
trademark use (it refers to another's use of a "mark or trade name"). The older state laws have
no such references. Some cases, such as Deere, have found dilution under state law even where
the offending party is not using plaintiff's mark as the defendant's mark.
81. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003). The Supreme Court
pointed out that the older state laws expressly include "injury to business reputation" among the
activities subject to liability. Id.
82. Because the factors are not mandatory, courts could use the federal factors. That
would lessen the potential confusion, but would make state law even more superfluous.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(4)(A) (2000).
84. 15 US.C.A. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007).
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laws patterned after the 1996 Model Bill provision contain the
original three exclusions.8 5 The significance of this difference is
unclear. These same state laws and the current federal law also
exclude any "noncommercial use" from liability.86 Many of the
situations covered by the new TDRA exclusion also will be
noncommercial uses. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether state law
will lack the protections of the new federal law.87
From the perspective of state laws, perhaps the most problematic
aspect of the TDRA is that it leaves unresolved a number of
interpretive issues on which the circuits had split. Several of these
splits appear to have been addressed by the language of the TDRA
itself: the new definition of fame does away with "niche fame" (a
mark famous only in a particular market).88 The TDRA makes clear
that non-inherently distinctive marks are eligible for dilution
protection, as long as they satisfy the criteria for fame. 89 All of this
may make litigating (though not necessarily winning) under the
TDRA easier than under the FTDA. However, it leaves most state
laws, whose language tracks the original FTDA, in an uncertain state.
Those laws have not been amended to ameliorate the interpretive
problems. To assume that they should be read as if they have been so
85. Nevada is an exception. Its version of the noncommercial use exclusion is not the
same as the Model Bill or the original FTDA. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.435(5)(a)
(LexisNexis 2004).
86. See 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c)(3)(C) (West Supp. 2007); MODEL STATE TRADEMARK
BILL § 13(d)(2) (INTA 2007), available at
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id= 1 393&ltemid=l 54&getco
ntent-3; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1448.01 C.2. (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-213(c)(2)
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151(3)(b) (West Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482-32(8)(c)
(Supp. 2006); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 1036/65(b)(2) (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-
214(c)(2) (Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.285(c)(2) (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-
13-334(4)(b) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-140(3)(b) (Supp. 2006); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1124(2) (West Supp. 2007).
87. It is also worth noting that older state laws and some newer ones lack any express
exclusions. Those statutes could cause some interpretive problems. See Mary LaFrance, Steam
Shovels and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public Domain, 6 NEV. L.J. 447, 462-63
(2006).
88. See, e.g., Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 306 n.87
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 05 C 1171,
2007 WL 2875232, at *3 (N.D. 11. 2007). Cf Phase Forward, Inc. v. Adams, No. C 05-4232 JF
(HRL), 2007 WL 2127338, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that California law appears to permit
niche fame).
89. The first sentence of the revised statute includes the following: "The owner of a
famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled
to an injunction [against dilution]." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 125(c)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
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amended would be questionable judicial policy.90 However, the
TDRA obviates the need for ever resolving these issues at the federal
level. Thus, it is likely that the splits will remain at the state level as
long as the cases are brought in federal court. In other words, federal
district courts likely will resolve the issues the way their circuits
previously resolved those same issues under the FTDA.9 1 The bottom
line is that the state statutes patterned after the FTDA contain all of
the drafting problems that caused Congress to pass the TDRA. Since
state court rulings on new state dilution laws are essentially non-
existent, this problem likely will persist, unless, and until, the state
legislatures amend their statutes.
92
The older state statutes-those worded like the 1964 Model
Bill-will not be so restricted, but their usefulness will still be
limited. In states where a less than famous mark can avail itself of
dilution protection (such as New York93) a few marks ineligible for
protection under the TDRA may still be available for state protection.
90. At least with regard to the issue decided in Moseley, federal courts interpreting state
laws have assumed that actual dilution is required where the statute contains the "causes
dilution" language. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 935 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003);
AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1045 n.5 (N.D. I11. 2006).
91. A recent district court case demonstrates how treacherous the analytical landscape
may be. In ComponentOne, L.L.C. v. ComponentArt, Inc., plaintiff asserted claims under both
federal and Pennsylvania dilution laws (Pennsylvania's law is patterned after the original
FTDA). ComponentOne, L.L.C. v. ComponentArt, Inc., No. 02:05cvl 122, 2007 WL 4302108,
at * I (W.D. Pa. Dec 6, 2007). The court first dismissed the federal claim, holding that the only
possible basis on which plaintiff could claim that its mark was famous was "niche" fame, and
that niche fame was eliminated by the TDRA. Id. at *2. Turning to the Pennsylvania claim, the
court noted that prior cases had held that Pennsylvania law should be interpreted to mirror
federal law. Id. at *3. It then held that, in the absence of Third Circuit precedent to the contrary,
it would continue to assume that Pennsylvania law mirrored federal law. Id. Therefore, it
dismissed the state dilution claim on the same grounds as it had dismissed the federal claim. Id.
However, Pennsylvania law clearly was not identical to the TDRA on this point, and the Third
Circuit, prior to the TDRA, had held that niche fame was cognizable under the FTDA. See id. at
6, n.1, citing Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157,
165 (3d Cir. 2000).
92. In the wake of the TDRA, INTA again has amended its Model State Trademark Bill's
dilution provision. See MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL (2007), available at
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task-view&id=l 393&Itemid= 154&getco
ntent=3. By and large, it adopts the language of the TDRA. However, there are two notable
exceptions. First, the new provision contains no "blurring" factors like the ones in the TDRA;
INTA believed that courts would interpret the state statutes to include the TDRA factors. See
INTA, Guide to Understanding the Model State Trademark Bill (2007),
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id = l 391 &ltemid=l 54&getco
ntent=3. Second, the new provision grants protection to marks that are famous in less than a
whole state. See MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13(b) (INTA 2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 14202(k)-(m), 14247 (West Supp. 2008) (adopting the 2007 Model Bill).
93. Florida used to be such a state, but its new statute requires that the mark be famous, at
least in Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West Supp. 2008).
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Even here, however, there are some limits. The extent to which a state
may enjoin out-of-state uses of a mark is, at the very least, subject to
disagreement.9 4 The other question relating to the older state laws is
the extent to which the exclusions contained in federal law should be
read into those laws, particularly noncommercial uses and nominative
uses.95 The problem has been ameliorated somewhat by court
decisions relying on the First Amendment to limit the reach of state
law.96 However, the scope of the TDRA exclusions may be more
protective of unauthorized uses than the First Amendment. The scope
of both the TDRA exclusions and the defenses available under state
laws remains an unknown.
VII. THE PROPER ROLE FOR STATE LAWS?
State dilution laws have proven to be an awkward addition to
trademark jurisprudence. This problem raises a larger issue: what is
the proper role for state regulation in trademark law? Trademark law,
after all, arose from state common law unfair competition law, and
federal law to this day reflects many of the common law traditions of
trademark. To view the problem in perspective, consider Justice
Brandeis's famous observation that states are laboratories where
different experiences could lead to creative solutions to social
problems.9 7 But, the true import of his observation must be viewed in
context. He also indicated that his vision was of states seeking
solutions more or less in isolation, so that they could "try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
98
Thus, one assumption behind such experimentation was that states
could cordon off their experiments from the rest of the country and
that they could legislatively respond to particular local conditions.
These particularized solutions could provide useful guidance when,
and if, national legislation was required.
Brandeis's vision provides us with one possible justification for
state regulation. State regulatory laws are easier to justify when they
94. See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Deere &
Co. v. MTD Prods. Inc., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1706 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); David S. Welkowitz,
Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 TULANE L. REV.
1 (1992). The 1996 and 2007 Model Bill provisions limit injunctions to the state borders.
95. See generally Mary LaFrance, No Reason To Live: Dilution Laws As Unconstitutional
Restrictions On Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709 (2007).
96. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26(1st Cir. 1987).
97. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
98. Id.
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respond to a unique local condition, and when they do not interfere
with the regulatory prerogatives of other states. For example, Nevada
would be expected to have a special interest in regulating the gaming
industry. 99 Its regulations, developed in response to the extensive
industry there, would provide a suitable laboratory for developing
appropriate means of regulating the industry in other states. As long
as gambling occurs on site at a casino (as opposed to, say, the
Internet), Nevada's regulations will not interfere with those of other
states. Health insurance, despite its status as a national issue, may also
exemplify this situation. States may have relatively unique problems:
rural state problems may differ from urban state problems. Some
states may, for various reasons, have much higher rates of uninsured
people. Immigration patterns may affect the issue of health insurance.
There may be some incidental extraterritoriality effects from state
regulation here, especially where workers live out of state, but
probably not anything like the problem of controlling trademark uses
outside of one's state. The Supreme Court's dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence also reflects the dichotomy between national and
local considerations. Some protectionist state legislation has been
allowed to stand when it responded to peculiar local conditions.1
00
As the economies of the different states become tied to the
national economy, however, isolated experiments have become more
difficult to perform. 10 1 In trademark law, unique local conditions are
less likely to be important enough to warrant unique state solutions. A
possible exception is geographic indications of origin. States with
large agricultural industries, such as California,10 2 may see a greater
need for protecting such indications than other states, but those are the
exceptions. In the ordinary course of trademark regulation, states will
have somewhat similar interests in protecting businesses from misuse
of their trademarks. State dilution laws were not, and are not, tailored
to peculiar local conditions. Even assuming that some states enacted
dilution laws to protect local businesses from harm, there is nothing in
99. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
100. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (upholding Maine's ban on
importation of bait fish because it "serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be
served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives").
101. This, too, is reflected in the Court's commerce clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., City of
Phila. v. New Jersey., 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (holding that a New Jersey law prohibiting
importation of out of state waste to protect local landfills violated the commerce clause).
102. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25240 et seq. (West 1997) (regulation of wine
labeling). Even those regulations, however, must be considered in light of existing federal law.
See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 425 (Cal. 2004) (holding that California regulations
are not preempted by federal regulations).
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any state's dilution law that is tailored to any peculiar local
conditions.10 3 Indeed, for decades INTA has attempted to convince
states to make their trademark laws as uniform as possible. 114 Many
trademark owners particularly those with strong trademarks, to which
dilution laws are most likely to apply, operate in multiple states.
Differences in state laws create a significant legal counseling problem
and a significant business strategy problem. This was one of the
reasons that trademark owners wanted a federal dilution law in the
first place, and why the advent of the Lanham Act was so important to
trademark owners. Therefore, there is a risk that the patchwork of
state laws will inhibit, rather than promote, economic progress in the
country. This is the antithesis of Brandeis's "no risk" idea.
Even if state dilution laws could be justified as a way to protect
local concerns, it is unlikely that local considerations are effectively
integrated into the process of deciding actual cases. The reason is
simple: state courts rarely get an opportunity to interpret their own
dilution laws. In all but a handful of reported cases, state dilution
claims are decided by federal courts as supplemental claims to a
federal trademark infringement and/or dilution claim.'0 5 This is a
natural consequence of the dominance of the federal regulatory
scheme in trademark law. As a result, rather than being interpreted
with an eye toward whatever local conditions may exist, state dilution
laws-most of which now track the original FTDA language-are
interpreted in a federal action, by the same court that ruled on the
federal claim. This also means that in most cases, any development of
state law is being left to federal courts to make their best "Erie"
'16
guess about the content of state law, with little likelihood that any
errors will be corrected in a timely fashion.'0 7 Compounding the
103. In any event, simple protectionism would be an inappropriate basis for passing
legislation. Whether such a law would pass constitutional muster, would depend on several
factors. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970) (distinguishing between "even handed" state regulation and discriminatory
legislation, with the latter receiving a different sort of scrutiny than the former).
104. See generally Andrew L. Goldstein, Bringing the Model State Trademark Bill into the
90s and Beyond, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 226 (1993).
105. A Westlaw search in the ALLSTATES database, using the parameters "trademark /s
dilution and date (>1946)," yielded 140 results. Ten of those were cases against insurance
companies to recover the cost of defending earlier federal trademark claims (including dilution).
Another group of cases indicated the filing of a dilution claim in the case, but without any
further discussion or resolution. The number of actual discussions, or even resolutions, of state
dilution claims in these cases, covering sixty years, is small.
106. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
107. In the area of rights of publicity, there have been some significant incorrect guesses.
Perhaps the most long lasting was the Second Circuit's incorrect assumption that New York
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problem, many states have enacted statutes directing courts to use
federal precedent as persuasive authority when interpreting similarly
worded state trademark laws.10 8 This combination of nearly exclusive
federal review and use of federal precedent means that there is little
room for state experimentation in this area. This problem is well
illustrated by the Second Circuit cases cited earlier. With one
exception, the major developments in New York dilution law have
been the result of federal cases, not interpretations made by New
York courts. 109
The few reported cases actually decided by state courts" 10 tend to
demonstrate that the situations warranting the use of state dilution
laws are sparse. A few recent cases are illustrative. In one state court
case, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a dilution claim brought by a
real estate developer against a real estate brokerage firm. The
developer operated a resort called Horseshoe Bay, and the broker
called itself Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Company."' This was a suit
between entities in complementary businesses, for which traditional
recognized a common law right of publicity. That error was not corrected for thirty years.
Compare Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1953)
(holding that New York common law recognizes a right of publicity) with Stephano v. News
Group Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that New York law does not
recognize a common law right of publicity; any such right is limited to the terms of the New
York statute).
108. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-218(b)(l) (200 1); CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14272 (West
Supp. 2008) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.181 (West Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-518 (2003);
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 1036/90 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-1-0.5
(West Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-220 (Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-127 (Supp.
2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13a (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); N.M. Stat. Ann., § 57-3B-2
(LexisNexis 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-518 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-102(2)
(Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.930 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-2-19
(LexisNexis 2006); see MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 19(b) (INTA 2007), available at
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id= 1393&ltemid = 154&getco
ntent=3.
109. The one exception is Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.,
369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977). There, New York's highest court finally had an opportunity to
interpret its law and decided that the statute must be read as written-without any requirement
of likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1165-66. In Illinois, state courts contributed one significant
element-that the original Illinois law did not apply to competitors. E.g., Edgewater Beach
Apartments Corp. v. Edgewater Beach Mgmt. Co., 299 N.E.2d 548, 554, (i1. App. Ct. 1973). In
Texas, a state court held that a non-trademark use as commentary was not actionable under
Texas law. Express One Int'l, Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. App. 2001). But
those were the exceptional cases.
110. See discussion supra note 105.
III. Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake Lyndon B. Johnson Improvement Corp., 53
S.W.3d 799, 811-12 (Tex. App. 2001). A similar case arose in Florida. See Tortoise Island
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tortoise Island Realty, Inc., 790 So. 2d 525, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (both dilution and confusion found).
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infringement provides adequate protection.112 Dilution added little to
the matter. A recent New York state case involved competing
beverage sellers.'13 This was largely a trade secret and unfair
competition case. 1 4 Dilution was not necessary to protect whatever
rights plaintiff had. 1 5 Another New York state case involved
competing gasoline station owners. 116 Again, dilution was not crucial
to protecting the trademark at issue. 17
Taking all of these matters into consideration, one must conclude
that the time for states to serve the laboratory function in this area has
passed (if it ever existed). There have been 60 years of
"experimentation"-and the reality of differential experimentation
has been thwarted by the understandable drive for uniformity in a
national economy, promoted by the very organization (INTA) whose
goal is to protect the value of trademarks. Brandeis wrote in an era
when there were few national economic regulatory laws, and states
were attempting to fill the gap left by Congress. In trademark law,
Congress now has regulated comprehensively, weighing the various
common law experiences of the states, their statutory experiences,
and now the experience using federal law, and has made decisions
about the scope of protection and remedies based on those judgments.
If unique local situations do not justify dilution laws, perhaps
there is a second circumstance in which state regulation can serve a
useful purpose: when federal regulation is needed, but not
forthcoming. Although non-uniform state regulation may cause some
problems, those problems may lead to a uniform federal solution.
Arguably, this was the role played by state dilution laws prior to the
FTDA. The legislative history refers to the "patch quilt" of state laws
then in existence." 18 A federal dilution provision would unify the
laws, providing a single national standard that could be enforced
anywhere in the country. Whether the disuniformity of state laws,
112. The court in this case upheld a finding of likelihood of confusion. Horseshoe Bay, 53
S.W.3d at 811.
113. Beverage Mktg. USA, Inc. v. S. Beach Beverage Co., Inc.. No. 265/2002, 2007 WL
1187975 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 11 2007).
114. Id.at*l,*10.
115. ld.at*1.
116. Gasoline Heaven at Commack, Inc. v. Nesconset Gas Heaven, Inc., 743 N.Y.S.2d 825
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). See also Humane Soc'y of Broward County, Inc. v. Fla. Humane Soc'y,
951 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (claims of dilution and confusion asserted);
Nutro Prods., Inc. v. Cole Grain Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 41, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (confusion and
dilution found in case between competitors).
117. Gasoline Heaven, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
118. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
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rather than some other influence (such as perceived international
pressure), was a major reason for the FTDA's passage is an open
question. Although state regulation certainly had its problems," 9 the
number of successful state dilution claims that did not also include a
finding of confusion was so small that it hardly warranted a federal
response. Even assuming that state laws played such a role, however,
it does not explain the need for state regulation after the passage of a
uniform federal law. This is particularly true when the majority of
state laws mirror the language of the federal law (as was the case until
the TDRA). Once there is a federal law in place, the continued use of
state law may upset the legislative balances built into federal law,
counseling against continued reliance on state legislation. 120
VIII. STATE LAWS IN THE SHADOW OF THE TDRA--OF WHAT
VALUE?
Given the many limitations of state dilution laws and the
availability of federal protection under the TDRA, the continued
usefulness of state dilution laws must be questioned. There are now
three different kinds of dilution statutes: Federal (famous mark
119. See Welkowitz, Preemption, supra note 94.
120. Two other intellectual property regimes, trade secrets and rights of publicity, rely
heavily on state law rather than federal law, in clear contrast to dilution where federal law now
dominates. In the case of trade secrets this may owe something to the widespread adoption of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Although not identical in all states, the Act apparently provides
sufficient uniformity that trade secret owners have not felt the same need for broad federal
protection. Note, however, that there is some federal trade secret protection, primarily via
criminal law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832 (2000), 1905 (2000 & Supp. V 2006). In addition, the
requirement of secrecy means that such protection is viewed as acting in concert with federal
patent protection, and not interfering with the balances in patent law. See Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 470-71 (1974) (obtaining a patent requires the inventor to disclose
the invention). The persistence and growth of state protection for celebrity rights is probably due
to several factors. First, rights of publicity are inherently personal to an actual individual (or
family). Although celebrity merchandising certainly is big business, the interest in protecting the
rights lies primarily with the individual. Thus, as long as the offender can be brought into the
celebrity's home state (or as long as another state can be persuaded to apply the celebrity's
home state law), the celebrity has little reason to lobby for a uniform federal law. Second,
although federal trademark law provides some protection for publicity rights-primarily via §
43(a) of the Lanham Act, but to a lesser extent also via § 2(a) and (c)-federal law does not
overwhelm this area of law to the same extent that it does trademark law. Third, it is possible
that the concentration of celebrity interests in California makes that state's law the dominant
player in this area, lessening the perceived need for federal protection.
Although many trade secret and rights of publicity claims are brought in federal court
(the former primarily as diversity claims, the latter sometimes as diversity claims and sometimes
as supplemental claims to claims under federal trademark law), a large number of these claims
are also brought in state courts. Thus, unlike the situation in dilution, the enforcement of state
laws may more accurately reflect local interests.
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required, likelihood of dilution standard), newer state laws (famous
mark required, actual dilution standard), and older state laws
(distinctive mark required, likelihood of dilution standard). This is a
poor state of affairs, especially if a plaintiff alleges federal dilution
claims and also claims under multiple state laws. 
121
The newer state laws have little utility after Moseley since the
TDRA provides an easier standard to meet. Even if the laws were
amended, they would do little more than duplicate federal law. The
older state laws have the same operative standard as the TDRA:
likelihood of dilution. Although they may protect a few marks not
famous enough for federal protection, they probably otherwise
duplicate federal protection. 122 Therefore, the major use for state laws
would seem to be remedies. The TDRA envisions injunctions as the
primary dilution remedy; it permits damages and other remedies only
under limited circumstances-when defendant "willfully intended" to
trade on the reputation of the famous mark or harm the reputation of
the famous mark. 123 Even when damages are available, punitive
damages cannot be recovered for Lanham Act violations; although
willfulness may make a court more willing to enhance the damages
under Section 35(a), damages must still be "compensation and not a
penalty."' 124 Attorney's fees are available under the Lanham Act, but
only in "exceptional cases."' 25 State laws are not subject to these
limitations for trademark violations. States may offer punitive damage
remedies and may be more lenient about awarding attorney's fees.
Such additional remedies are not preempted by the Lanham Act.
26
However, attempting to use state law for remedy enhancement
usually will prove ephemeral, and it is an inappropriate reason for the
existence of state dilution laws. Older state laws, which are now more
in line with the operative standard of federal law, only provide for
injunctive relief, although there may be attorney's fee provisions in
other state statutes. 1 7 Newer state laws, which provide for non-
121. Compare MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13 (INTA 1996) with MODEL STATE
TRADEMARK BILL §§ 1(k)-(m), 13 (INTA 2007).
122. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
123. Lanham Act § 43(c)(5)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(5)(B) (West Supp. 2007).
124. Id. § 35(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 1117(a) (West Supp. 2007).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., JCW lnvs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 917-19 (7th Cir. 2007).
127. See, e.g., The Humane Soc'y of Broward County, Inc. v. Fla. Humane Soc'y, 951 So.
2d 966, 968, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (awarding attorney's fees to defendant under
Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act).
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injunctive relief, are restricted by the actual dilution requirement. 28 In
addition, most newer state laws, like the FTDA, only permit damage
awards for willful dilution. 129 Thus, damages are unlikely to be
awarded under state dilution law in cases where federal law would not
allow them.' 30 Even if state laws are amended to conform to the
federal operative standard (i.e., likelihood of dilution), is it worth
having state laws whose primary utility is to enhance the available
damages? One would expect trademark owners to answer with a
resounding "Yes." When state laws are primarily vehicles to enhance
remedies for the same underlying acts as federal law, however, they
alter the balances built into federal law. Congress has decided that
damages under the Lanham Act shall be "compensation and not a
penalty." Of what value is that decision if states can easily override
it?
Moreover, this is not a situation in which state laws are filling a
hole in federal law. Congress' decision to limit the available remedies
in federal trademark cases does not appear to have been casual. One
should assume that the limits in the Lanham Act reflect a considered
choice among alternatives. There is no inadvertent "hole" in the
damage provisions. Therefore, state laws can only interfere with
Congress's choices, which is not an appropriate basis for state
legislation.
IX. SHOULD STATE LAWS BE PREEMPTED?
The preceding discussion seems to lead to an obvious solution:
federal preemption of state law. That theoretically clean solution,
however, may not be the most practical one. Perhaps the most
compelling reason to leave state dilution laws in place is the
comparative difficulty of eliminating them. It is unrealistic to assume
that state legislatures will repeal them, unless INTA or some other
equally powerful group makes it a priority. That leaves preemption by
a federal statute. In one respect, Congress did recognize the need to
128. Florida and California are exceptions. Their new statutes use a likelihood of dilution
standard and allow non-injunctive relief. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West Supp. 2008); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 14202(k)-(m), 14247 (West Supp. 2008).
129. E.g., MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13 (INTA 2007), available at
http://www.inta.org/indiex.php?option=comconent&task=view&id= 1393&ltemid= 154&getco
ntent=3.; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11(i) (West 2005); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
1036/65(a) (West 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-513(b) (2001).
130. There may be a rare case in which a mark is famous in the state but not nationally,
allowing state relief but not federal. These will be very unusual situations. If states adopt the
2007 version of the Model Bill they would protect marks that are famous in a city or region of a
state, but which may not be nationally famous.
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preempt state dilution law-where the state law is being applied to a
federally registered mark. 131 This was certainly a logical step, but it
takes an unusual fact setting for it to apply, particularly in a state
whose dilution law requires a "famous" mark. Unless the plaintiffs
mark became famous after the other user's mark was federally
registered, it is hard to see why there would not have been a
successful opposition to federal registration.132  Thus, federal
preemption under Section 43(c)(6) is not a major factor in dilution.
Any additional preemptive effect must await future federal
legislation, but the experience with express preemption in copyright
suggests that one should proceed here with caution. Section 301 of the
Copyright Act preempts any state laws granting rights "equivalent to"
copyright. 133 Unfortunately, this provision has led to some difficult
interpretive issues, not all of which have been satisfactorily
resolved. 34 Courts have found numerous state laws that protect some
form of "copying" not preempted by § 301 on the ground that the
state law requires something "extra"-something more than just
copying. 35 The model for preemption in the dilution area might be §
43(c)(6) of the Lanham Act, which preempts state dilution laws to the
extent that they are being used against a mark that is federally
registered.1 36 Unfortunately, there are no cases interpreting the new
version, and very few interpreting the prior version, so we have little
real guidance. Section 43(c)(6) does not contain the Copyright Act's
"equivalent to" language; it simply states that actions brought under
state law to prevent certain categories of dilutive activities are barred
131. The current version of this provision is found at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(6) (West
Supp. 2007).
132. Obviously, the owner of the famous mark could simply have overlooked the
registration application. But if the mark was famous-even if only within the state--one would
expect the mark owner to be reasonably diligent in protecting its mark. It is also possible that the
two parties operate in such different spheres that confusion was unlikely. However, the Patent
and Trademark Office can use dilution under Section 43(c) as a basis for refusal to register,
provided it is raised in an opposition proceeding. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(0, 1063(a) (2000).
(Dilution under state law is not a basis for refusal of federal registration). Section 43(c) does not
require a mark to be registered to be protected, although it does require it to be famous as
measured by federal standards. And the PTO considers the "fame" of a mark when analyzing
likelihood of confusion (and, for that purpose, fame is not measured as stringently as for
dilution). A few marks could fall through these cracks and obtain a federal registration, but it
should not be a large number.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
134. See I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.0 1[B]
(2007) (noting the lack of clarity in this area).
135. Id. § 1.01[B][1].
136. 15 U.S.C.A. §1 125(c)(6).
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if the defendant has a federally registered mark. Therefore, the issue
of sufficient "plus" factors may not be a problem here. As a model for
a future preemption provision, however, the language of § 43(c)(6) is
not without its difficulty. Subsection (A) limits itself to state laws
protecting against "dilution by bluffing or dilution by tamishment."'' 37
Those categories are specifically defined by the TDRA, but almost no
current state law uses or defines the terms "blurring" and
"tarnishment."'' 38 Thus, unless this section was intended to include
state laws that protect against things "equivalent to" those categories,
it would be of limited current use. 139 Subsection (B) does seem to
have learned from the copyright experience; it preempts claims "of
actual or likely damage or harm to the distinctiveness or reputation of
a mark, label, or form of advertising."'' 40 This appears to be designed
to cover the forms of dilution generally recognized by state law, and
uses the language in which state protection is couched. The limited
context in which this provision operates, however, masks the
problems that would arise if it were extended to preempt state laws in
all contexts. Since § 43(c)(6) only applies when the defendant has a
registered mark, it is unlikely to apply to state protections for
.intellectual property that are not aimed at trademarks or
advertisements. If the provision were to be extended to bar any action
brought under state laws regulating potentially dilutive activity,
regardless of the existence of a registered mark, some of the
Copyright Act's difficulties may emerge. For example, would a state
right of publicity law be considered a claim of harm to the
distinctiveness of a mark, if the celebrity's name or likeness was used
as a mark? Would it be considered a claim of harm to the
distinctiveness of a "form of advertising" if the celebrity bringing the
action had endorsed products? No doubt Congress would not intend
such results, but they may be difficult to draft around entirely.
That the FTDA was enacted and then significantly amended
without preempting state laws indicates that Congress probably does
not wish to take this step. As noted earlier, the legislative history of
137. Lanham Act § 43(c)(6)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C.A. §1 125(c)(6)(A)(ii).
138. The Indiana statute does use the term "tarnish," limiting eligibility under its statute to
fanciful marks, "except in cases where the other person's use tarnishes the reputation of the
famous mark." IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-1-13.5(a) (West Supp. 2007). California adopted the
2007 Model Bill, which uses those terms. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 14202(k)-(m), 14247
(West Supp. 2008).
139. It is possible that the drafters anticipated the new version of the Model Bill which
tracks the language of the TDRA. That could prevent certain interpretive issues from arising
later and obviate the need for further revision of the federal statute.
140. Lanham Act § 43(c)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(6)(B).
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the FTDA demonstrates that Congress deliberately left state dilution
laws in place. Unlike patent and copyright, where the Constitution
specifically grants Congress authority to make laws, 141 trademark law
was largely a state and common law matter until the mid-twentieth
century. 142 Thus, preempting state law could be a politically tricky
issue.
In short, the combination of political reality and drafting
difficulties make repeal and/or express preemption an unrealistic goal
at this time. Courts may decide that limited preemption should exist to
the extent that state laws are used to subvert the structure of federal
law, and constitutional provisions like the First Amendment limit the
extent to which state laws can be used to subvert free speech. For the
time being, leaving state laws alone is probably the more logical
approach.
X. STATE LAWS AS A FAMOUS MARKS GAP-FILLER?
Even if they are not preempted, state laws have very little
constructive role to play in a conventional dilution claim. At most,
they add protection around the edges, but in ways that may upset the
balance struck by Congress in the FTDA. Ironically, if the door is
closing on state dilution laws, it may be opening in another,
somewhat related area of trademark law. The protection of "famous"
marks is not confined to dilution statutes. Conventional infringement
law and unfair competition law give extra protection to famous marks
by finding confusion in many situations where suits by owners of
lesser known marks would fail.' 43 The ordinary operation of
trademark law in such cases does not require the addition of state law.
There is one aspect of the protection of famous marks, however, that
may lead to the enlistment of state law, at least temporarily.
Traditional trademark doctrine in the United States holds that
trademark protection is founded on use, not simply registration. Due
to trademark's roots in unfair competition, the use must occur in an
area where the two parties compete. In the case of foreign marks, this
means that protection in the United States is extended only to marks
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
142. In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court held that the Patent and Copyright
Clause does not confer authority on Congress to regulate trademarks. Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879). There were federal trademark statutes before the Lanham Act, but their
scope was not nearly as comprehensive as the Lanham Act. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, §
5:3.
143. See 2 id. § 11:78; In re. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (considering the "fame" of the mark as a factor in opposition proceedings).
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that are used in the United States, or at least where there is a bona fide
intent to use in the near future. 144 Indeed, this principle is generally
recognized as a consequence of territoriality-that a country's laws
generally will only protect marks that are used in the territory of that
country. 145 Thus, in Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman,146 the court
upheld the U.S. registration of a mark by someone who had seen the
mark being used on clothing in Japan and who decided to use it in the
United States, without the knowledge or consent of the Japanese
trademark owner. 147 Despite the apparent bad faith of the applicant,
because the mark had not been used in the United States, the court
applied the principle of territoriality and ruled that the first person to
use the mark in the United States was entitled to the U.S. rights, not
the first to use it anywhere in the world.
48
To this principle of territoriality, there has been a seldom used,
but fairly widely recognized exception: if the non-U.S. mark is
"famous" in the United States, then courts will prevent a second user
from obtaining rights in the United States, notwithstanding the lack of
use in this country. This exception appears to have originated in two
decisions of New York's trial level courts, both involving Parisian
restaurants. The first suit was by the Paris restaurant Maison Prunier
against a New York restaurant named Prunier's Restaurant and
Cafd. 149 The court noted that the New York restaurant was not only
using the Prunier name, but also the same slogan as its Parisian
counterpart. Citing Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, 50 the court
held that the New York restaurant was engaging in unfair competition
under New York law.15 1 The second case, which is often cited as the
origin of the doctrine, was a suit by the Parisian restaurant Maxim's
144. Section 44(e) of the Lanham Act allows marks registered in foreign countries to be
registered in this country without actual use, but it does require the registrant to file a written
statement attesting to its bona fide intent to use the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2000 & Supp.
2006). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(3) (2000) (exempting applications filed under Section 44
from requirement of filing statement of use).
145. See, e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1998) (predicting a decline in territoriality).
146. Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
147. Id. at 1571-72. In the same proceeding, the Japanese company's U.S. registration was
cancelled.
148. Id. at 1568-69, 1571-72.
149. Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Rest. & Caf6, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
150. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. This Convention, to which
the United States has long been an adherent, requires its members to provide certain protections
for trademarks and patents.
151. Maison Prunier, 288 N.Y.S. at 532.
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against the owner's of a Maxim's restaurant in New York. I1 2 Though
the Paris Maxim's had no branches in the United States, its mark was
well known in New York, and was probably the reason the New York
restauranteur chose the name.153 Therefore, the court enjoined the
New York restaurant's use of the name, based on a likelihood of
confusion between the two restaurants. 
54
Following Vaudable, the so-called "famous marks" doctrine has
been applied in federal trademark cases by the PTO's Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board, 155 and by the Ninth Circuit.156 Moreover, as
seen in the earliest of the New York state cases, the concept of special
treatment for famous marks has long been a part of international
conventions, notably the Paris Convention, to which the United States
is an adherent. 57 Section 44 of the Lanham Act implements these
treaty obligations in the federal trademark law.
Recently, however, the Second Circuit has called into question
the use of the famous marks doctrine under federal trademark law. In
ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 1 s the court rejected arguments that the
famous marks doctrine is a part of federal trademark law. Noting that
the Paris Convention and TRIPS are not self-executing, 59 the court
looked for implementing legislation that would support a famous
marks exception to territoriality. The court held that nothing in
Section 44 of the Lanham Act, which implements various treaties to
which the U.S. is a signatory (including the Paris Convention and
TRIPS), evinced a Congressional intent to abrogate the usual
territoriality rule. 60  However, the court limited its decision
concerning territoriality to federal law; it did not rule out protection
under state law. Since the only relevant precedent in New York was
152. Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
153. Id. at 335.
154. Id. at 336. Although it did not rely on the New York dilution statute, the court also
cited a pre-statutory decision that relied on a dilution theory. Id. at 335, citing Tiffany & Co. v.
Tiffany Prods., 264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 260 N.Y.S. 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932),
aff'd, 188 N.E. 30 (N.Y. 1933).
155. See Mother's Rest., Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046,
1048 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (dicta).
156. Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004).
157. The Paris Convention only applied to trademarks. The TRIPS Agreement extends the
Paris Convention's protection to service marks. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135,
156 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing article 6bis of the Paris Convention), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288
(2007).
158. ITCLtd.,482F.3dat 135.
159. Id. at 161-62.
160. Id. at 162-64.
A FUTURE FOR STATE DILUTION LAWS?
the two trial court opinions discussed above, the Second Circuit
certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question whether New
York recognizes a famous marks doctrine and, if so, what level of
notoriety is required for a mark to be considered famous. 16 1 The
Second Circuit's decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, which
denied review, despite the apparent split in authority between the
Second and Ninth Circuits on this issue.
62
At least in the Second Circuit, there now is an arguable "gap" in
federal trademark law. Unlike the circumstances in which state laws
are used to enhance federal remedies for the same conduct, state
regulation in this area would not upset a considered choice by
Congress. Until Punchgini, the existence of a famous marks exception
had been widely accepted, even if seldom applied. There is no
indication that Congress intentionally omitted protection for famous
foreign marks from the Lanham Act. 163 This suggests the existence of
a true gap in federal protection.
The question is whether filling that gap with state unfair
competition law is any more appropriate than using state dilution laws
was before the advent of federal dilution law. In this area, as with
dilution, there will be several problems with applying state law. If
states have different standards of what constitutes a "famous" mark,
then mark owners, both foreign and domestic, will not have a
consistent set of rules under which to operate. Where U.S. law
interacts with foreign markets, it seems more desirable to have an
applicable uniform federal law than a series of state laws.
Furthermore, the issue of the territorial reach of a state court
injunction would arise, just as it does with state dilution laws.' 64 If the
offending use is limited to a single state, as it was in Maison Prunier
and Vaudable, then there will not be a problem with the reach of the
state law. However, if the issue extends beyond a single state, the
different standards potentially applicable could cause problems.
Finally, since the issue of protecting famous marks is embodied in
161. Id. at 166-69. The court's certification discussed a number of possible measures of
"fame," but left it to the New York courts to decide which, if any, would be the proper measure.
Id. at 169. The response of the New York Court of Appeals is at 880 N.E.2d 852 (N.Y. 2007).
See infra footnote 170.
162. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007).
163. At least at the time of the TRIPS Agreement there was enough precedent applying the
exception that Congress could have relied on its existence.
164. Welkowitz, Preemption, supra note 94.
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treaties, using state law means that the implementation of U.S. treaty
obligations 65 will be subject to the vagaries of state law.
On the other hand, there are some arguments in favor of allowing
state law to fill the apparent gap. As discussed earlier, state law is
most appropriate where there are local conditions requiring solutions
tailored to those circumstances. As shown by the facts of Grupo
Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 166 the Ninth Circuit case,
there may be circumstances where local conditions are applicable.
The GIGANTE mark, used by a Mexican grocery chain, was not well
known throughout the United States. California, however, has a large
immigrant population from Mexico, where the mark is well known. 67
Thus, the potential for confusion is particularly acute in Southern
California. Unlike dilution claims, which paradigmatically involve
non-competing goods, these unfair competition claims involve
competing goods. 68 Finally, at least in the short term, it would make
it less likely that the United States would face a proceeding in the
World Trade Organization claiming a failure to implement the TRIPS
Agreement. United States treaty obligations did not require a
comprehensive dilution statute.
XI. CONCLUSION
For almost fifty years, until the FTDA arrived in 1996, state
dilution laws existed in relative obscurity, below the radar screens of
many trademark lawyers. The FTDA raised the profile of trademark
dilution, but after the TDRA it has left little reason for the existence
of a parallel, and non-uniform, set of state laws. Nevertheless, neither
express preemption nor repeal appears to be a realistic option in the
foreseeable future. State laws probably will continue to operate in the
background, their true relevance limited to lesser marks.' 69 As long as
165. This assumes that the treaties do, in fact, obligate the United States to breach the
territoriality rule for famous marks. The provisions are not crystal clear on this point.
166. Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
167. The Mexican and U.S. uses were both in connection with grocery stores. Id. at 1091.
168. It should be noted that the TRIPS Agreement extends protection to famous marks
even where the goods or services in question are not competing. Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC, art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
Whether states would be willing to extend their unfair competition laws to such situations (at
least absent likelihood of confusion) is difficult to determine. Almost no states have been willing
to recognize common law dilution claims, leaving such claims to statutory implementation.
169. Even as to those marks, as shown in the discussion above, when there is no federal
dilution claim available, state dilution laws often simply "pile on" to an ordinary infringement
situation.
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they do not interfere with the operation of federal law, and do not
upset the balances built into federal law, their continued existence
will not significantly affect the path of trademark law.
More important is what the progress (or lack thereof) of state
dilution law over the past sixty years can teach us about the efficacy
of state regulation of intellectual property. Absent special local
conditions, one would expect intellectual property owners to seek
certainty through uniformity. The history of state dilution laws shows
that trademark owners have sought such uniformity, though their
efforts have now created significant disuniformity. Although states
may play a role in the process of deciding the proper regulatory path,
by demonstrating potential flaws in different regulatory schemes,
eventually the sensible result is a national solution that properly
balances the interests of intellectual property owners and others who
wish to use that intellectual property and that minimizes the
uncertainty faced by both groups.
State dilution laws may have run their course, but the current
split in the circuits concerning the Lanham Act's protection of
"famous" marks that are not used in this country provides an
opportunity to review the efficacy of state trademark regulation in a
discrete corner of trademark law. The Second Circuit's certification to
the New York Court of Appeals of the question of the extent of state
law protection in such cases assures a rare decision by the state's
highest court, which may inform the debate about how to handle this
problem. 170 Ultimately, however, leaving international obligations to
the vagaries of state law invites difficulties, especially in a system,
like the WTO, where the obligations can be enforced by an outside
authority. While certain governmental responsibilities are best
handled locally, others, such as transnational intellectual property
rights, seem to require a national solution.
170. As noted in the earlier discussion, the only New York decisions on point had been
from the state's trial court. The New York Court of Appeals held that there is no special
"famous marks" exception under New York law. However, it also held that a claim for
misappropriation and unfair competition could be brought under New York law if the defendant
"deliberately copied" plaintiffs mark and if the "relevant consumer market [in New York] ...
primarily associates the ... mark" with the goods or services of the plaintiff. ITC, Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 860 (N.Y. 2007).
2008]
* * *
